Gourmet Hunter


Following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2016, Beijing has dramatically increased its coercion against Taiwan. A major reason for China’s increased coercive efforts is the DPP administration’s unwillingness to explicitly endorse the exact verbiage of the “one China” formulation that Beijing demands for maintaining cross-Strait relations, despite President Tsai’s use of another framework that includes a number of elements that contain the idea of “one China.” As part of this framework, during her inaugural address President Tsai said her administration would conduct cross-Strait affairs “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution [and] the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area,” while recognizing and praising the benefits of the two sides’ historical efforts to set aside differences and find common ground. Since her inauguration, President Tsai has persisted in seeking to maintain stability in cross-Strait relations and rejecting a “return to the old path of confrontation.” She has followed a cross-Strait policy of maintaining the status quo, pursuing neither formal independence for Taiwan nor unification of Taiwan and China, and has repeatedly demonstrated goodwill toward Beijing and sought to reassure her counterparts across the Taiwan Strait. During a May 2018 meeting with the Commission in Taiwan, one Taiwan government official stated that Taipei has “strategic tenacity.” The official explained that Taipei will “maintain a predictable policy” and not provoke Beijing.


In contrast, Beijing has taken significant actions to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and advance its broader goal of eventual cross-Strait unification. The coercive measures Beijing is employing against Taiwan include suspending official and semi-official cross-Strait communication and meetings,* and the use of economic pressure such as reducing Chinese tourism to Taiwan. Additionally, Beijing has ended the cross-Strait “diplomatic truce” and returned to enticing Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners to cut off official relations with Taiwan, put pressure on Taiwan’s presence in countries with which it has unofficial relations, and intervened in the repatriation of Taiwan citizens from abroad. In the latter case, Beijing demanded that Taiwan citizens accused of telecommunications fraud in countries with which Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations be sent to China, and refused to honor Taipei’s request that they be sent to Taiwan. Other coercive measures Beijing has taken include blocking Taiwan’s participation in certain international fora in which it could previously participate, pressuring U.S. and other foreign companies to change the way they characterize Taiwan on their websites and products, and expanding and intensifying Chinese military training activities near Taiwan.


As Beijing has reduced contact with and sought to isolate President Tsai and her administration, who Beijing views as seeking independence through both formal and “soft” means, it has continued its outreach to opposition politicians at the party and local government levels as a way to constrain the DPP and promote China’s preferred cross-Strait policy. Beijing’s approach also includes efforts to undermine Taiwan’s democracy through collaboration with various individuals and groups in Taiwan, such as organizations that support cross-Strait unification, and spreading disinformation through social media and other online tools.‡


To respond to Beijing’s increasing pressure, President Tsai has continued her efforts to pursue economic growth, find new markets and trade partnerships, and support new innovative and job-creating industries. Simultaneously, Taiwan is seeking to enhance its defensive capabilities to counter China’s military coercion. To aid in these efforts, Taiwan is looking to strengthen its partnership with the United States.


This section explores recent developments in cross-Strait relations, cross-Strait trade and investment, Taiwan’s international engagement, the cross-Strait military balance, and U.S.-Taiwan relations. It is based on consultations with experts on Taiwan and cross-Strait relations, the Commission’s fact-finding trip to Taiwan in May 2018, and open source research and analysis.


Beijing Formalizes Increasingly Hardline Policy


In his remarks on Taiwan at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held in October 2017, Chinese President and General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping signaled that the hardline approach the CCP has taken toward Taiwan and cross-Strait unification in recent years had become official policy. Linking together and expanding on some of the most forceful language any of his predecessors had used at previous CCP congresses, including during earlier periods of elevated cross-Strait tensions, President Xi declared:


We have firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan independence secession plot. We will never allow any person, any organization, or any political party to split any part of Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form.


Furthermore, President Xi did not directly mention either of his immediate predecessors’ ideological contributions to China’s crossStrait policy, signaling that he is increasingly confident in reshaping cross-Strait relations along his own lines. In their policy remarks, then Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had included relatively conciliatory language on Taiwan’s engagement with the international community and what Beijing would grant Taiwan in a future unification arrangement. The new language used by President Xi suggests that while China may continue efforts to develop cross-Strait economic and social ties, its overall approach has become more intolerant of any opposition from Taipei on the terms of cross-Strait relations and eventual unification dictated by Beijing. Moreover, China’s policy appears to reflect a shift from focusing on deterring Taiwan from seeking de jure independence, and a patient stance toward unification, to actively pushing toward unification.


The formalization of a more uncompromising cross-Strait policy at the 19th Party Congress is even more concerning in light of the sense of urgency and militarized nature of the approach Beijing has taken toward Taipei since President Xi assumed office, and which has intensified since President Tsai’s election in 2016. In 2013, for example, long before President Tsai was elected, President Xi publically stated that “the longstanding political differences between the two sides of the Strait … must not be passed down from generation to generation.” This statement went beyond what other Chinese leaders have said about the urgency of resolving cross-Strait political differences and suggests President Xi may feel a personal responsibility to make significant headway toward advancing unification between the two sides.


China has also increased the use of military intimidation against Taiwan under President Xi’s administration. In 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a major amphibious assault exercise in the then Nanjing Military Region across from Taiwan after having refrained from carrying out these types of provocative training events during much of the Hu Jintao era. Bonnie S. Glaser, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ China Power Project, writes that “between 2006 and 2012, it is difficult to find exercises overtly and explicitly aimed at intimidating Taiwan.” In 2015, still during the term of President Tsai’s predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), China broadcast footage of a military exercise where the PLA practiced storming a mock-up of Taiwan’s Presidential Palace in Taipei. Since this time, PLA exercises and other training activities targeting Taiwan have expanded and intensified, suggesting Beijing may now be more willing to countenance the threat of military force against Taiwan to achieve its political objectives.

在習主席的統治下,中國也加強了對台灣的軍事恐嚇。2013年,人民解放軍在台灣對面的南京軍區進行了一次重大的兩棲攻擊演習,然而在胡錦濤任職的大部分期間,則未曾實施這類挑釁的訓練活動。華府智庫「戰略與國際研究中心」的「中國軍力計畫」主任葛來儀(Bonnie S. Glaser)寫道:「在2006年至2012年間舉行的演習中,很難找到恐嚇台灣的公開、明確意圖。」2015年,在蔡總統的前任總統,中國國民黨(國民黨)馬英九總統的任期中,中國曾播放一段解放軍模擬突襲台灣總統府(位於台北)的軍事演習畫面。從那時起,解放軍已陸續增強、擴大針對台灣的演習和其他軍事演練活動,此舉表明北京現在為了實現政治目標,可能更願意採取對台軍事威脅。

The Struggle for Taiwan’s International Space


Beijing Steps up Efforts to Restrict Taiwan’s Participation in the International Community


While Beijing has pursued a more uncompromising cross-Strait policy since President Xi assumed office, its efforts to compress Taiwan’s international space by undermining Taipei’s efforts to participate in the international community accelerated and intensified in 2018, as Beijing took significant new steps in the following areas.


Ending the cross-Strait “diplomatic truce”: Beijing has long sought to cut off Taiwan’s ability to independently access the community of nations as a peer to other states, seeking to force others to treat Taiwan as a sub-sovereign part of Beijing’s China. Beijing has pursued the goal of reducing or removing Taiwan’s space in the international community with varying degrees of aggressiveness. During the Ma Administration (2008–2016), China paused its efforts to poach Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, as a reward for Ma’s cross-Strait policy, which Beijing saw as more in line with its views. However, since President Tsai was elected, Beijing has ended its tacit “diplomatic truce” with Taipei, resuming its campaign of eliminating Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. Beijing has returned to pursuing deals to entice the few remaining states who recognize the government on Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, the Republic of China (ROC)—Taiwan’s official name. These deals require governments to drop recognition of Taipei as the ROC and recognize Beijing as the sole legal government of China, including a statement with some formulation of Beijing’s “One China Principle” that implies Taiwan is under Beijing’s sovereignty.


Since President Tsai’s election, Beijing has established relations with six countries that broke ties with Taipei.* In 2018 alone, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador broke with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with China. In an example of Beijing resuming efforts to entice countries to break ties with Taiwan, an unnamed Taiwan official said that Beijing offered the Dominican Republic financial assistance, low-interest loans, and investments worth at least $3.1 billion in exchange for breaking ties with Taiwan and establishing ties with China.


After the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador established diplomatic relations with China, there are 17 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.* However, concerns are now growing that other countries will follow suit in severing their diplomatic ties. For example, in September 2018, Beijing and the Vatican reached a provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops—one of the longstanding areas of disagreement that the two sides have been seeking to address through talks for years—which could set the conditions for the Vatican to switch diplomatic recognition. A resolution of these issues puts Taiwan’s relations with the Holy See at risk.


Although recognition by other states is widely viewed as a component of state sovereignty, the importance of the total number of countries that recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) is an open question. Symbolically, these relationships confer legitimacy on Taiwan’s position on the world stage in the face of marginalization by Beijing. Practically, their advocacy for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations helps Taiwan in its pursuit of greater international space. However, Taiwan almost certainly gains more from its unofficial relations with countries that have extensive international influence than it gains from official diplomatic relationships.‡ Even without formal diplomatic relations, a country like the United States can promote expanded opportunities for Taiwan to participate in the international community and support Taiwan in other ways.


Continuing to block Taiwan’s participation in international fora: For the second year in a row, Beijing prevented the Taiwan government from participating as an observer in the UN World Health Assembly; previously, Taipei received an invitation each year between 2009 and 2016. Since April 2016, Taiwan officials and citizens have been prevented from participating in numerous international fora in which they participated in preceding years.


Although Beijing has increased its pressure on Taiwan’s presence in certain international fora since President Tsai’s election, Taiwan has long been unable to participate in many other inter-national meetings and organizations, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and most meetings of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between 2009 and 2017, the World Health Organization only granted Taiwan access to 46 of the 154 technical meetings to which it applied to attend. Notably, INTERPOL’s most recent president was Meng Hongwei, China’s vice minister of public security. He was elected at the general assembly in November 2016. (For more information see Chapter 2, Section 1, “Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs.”)


Pressuring foreign companies to change references to Taiwan and Taiwan companies to support Beijing: Since January 2018, Beijing has pressured numerous foreign companies, including several U.S. corporations, to change the way they categorized or depicted Taiwan on their customer service literature, websites, or products. Beginning January 11, the Shanghai branch of the Cyberspace Administration of China shut down Marriott’s Chinese website for a week as punishment for listing Taiwan as well as Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet as separate from China on a questionnaire for customers. It also ordered companies Zara and Medtronic to apologize for their characterization of Taiwan on their websites after Zara included Taiwan in a list of countries and Medtronic listed Taiwan as “Republic of China (Taiwan).”


譯註 1 本處翻譯根據新華網新聞「上海網信辦:萬豪國際集團推出八項整改措施」

On January 12, China’s Civil Aviation Administration announced it had ordered Delta Airlines to change its inclusion of Taiwan on a list of countries on the airline’s website and issue a public apology. The agency also announced it would demand that all foreign airlines with flights to China inspect all information for customers, such as websites and apps, and to “strictly follow China’s laws and regulations.” Later, the agency demanded that 44 foreign airlines change their designation of Taiwan to indicate that Taiwan is part of China by July 25; as of August, all but three had done so. Those airlines (American Airlines, Delta Airlines, and United Airlines), all U.S.-based, have changed the designation from “Taipei, Taiwan” to “Taipei,” but have not added “China” after it as Beijing demanded.


In another case, President Tsai’s August 2018 visit to a branch of Taiwan bakery chain 85C in Los Angeles, during which an employee asked her to sign a pillow, incurred a harsh reaction in China.


Although it is unclear whether the Chinese government had a role, the response included outrage and calls for a boycott by Chinese netizens, some Chinese e-commerce companies notifying partners that they should remove 85C from their sites, and an article in the Global Times denouncing the chain.


Pressuring unofficial diplomatic partners: Two more countries— Jordan and Papua New Guinea—downgraded their unofficial relations with Taiwan in 2018 due, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to pressure from Beijing. In February, Taiwan announced that the Papua New Guinean government ordered Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby to remove “Republic of China (on Taiwan)” from its name and to remove consular license plates from its cars. Then, in April, the Ministry said the Jordanian government requested the Taiwan representative office in Amman change its name from the “Commercial Office of the Republic of China (Taiwan)” to the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office.” Since 2017, the governments of all six countries in which the name of Taiwan’s representative office includes “Taiwan,” “Republic of China”, or “ROC” have requested the office change these parts of the name to “Taipei.”

壓迫非正式的外交夥伴:台灣外交部表示,由於北京的壓力,又有兩個國家──約旦和巴布亞紐幾內亞──在2018年降級了與台灣的非正式關係。 2月,台灣宣布,巴布亞紐幾內亞政府下令位於莫士比港的中華民國(台灣)駐巴布亞紐幾內亞商務代表團將其名稱中刪除「中華民國(台灣)」,並從車上移走外交領事車牌。然後,4月,台灣外交部表示,約旦政府要求位於安曼的中華民國駐約旦商務辦事處更名,改為駐約旦臺北經濟文化辦事處。自2017年以來,六個國家的政府都要求國內的台灣代表處辦公室將名稱中包含「台灣」、「中華民國(Republic of China)」或「中華民國(ROC)」的部分更改為「台北」。

Restricting Chinese tourism to Taiwan’s diplomatic partners: Beijing has used travel bans to punish Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and incentivize them to switch ties to China. In November 2017, China’s National Tourism Administration banned Chinese tourist companies from offering group tours to Palau and the Vatican, two of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. The ban came two days after Taiwan and Palau announced they would be increasing the number of direct flights between them.

限制中國旅遊業者前往台灣友邦:北京使用旅行禁令懲罰台灣的友邦,並鼓勵他們改變與中國的關係。 2017年11月,中國國家旅遊局禁止中國旅遊公司組團旅遊帛琉和梵蒂岡(台灣的兩個邦交國)。這條禁令發佈於台灣和帛琉宣布將增加雙方直航航班量的兩天後。

Treating Taiwan as Chinese territory through unilateral activation of new flight routes: In January 2018, Beijing expanded use of the M503 commercial air route§ near the median line of the Taiwan Strait to allow northbound traffic, and opened three extension routes near some of Taiwan’s outlying islands, without consulting with Taipei—treating Taiwan as a subordinate entity rather than a separately administered area. Previously, in 2015, Beijing attempted to open the M503 route and the extension routes unilaterally, but later engaged in negotiations with Taipei and agreed to only allow southbound flights on M503.


Hong Kong: Views from Taiwan


Some observers in Taiwan, as well as the Taiwan government, are concerned about the fate of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. Broadly, the idea of adopting Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” framework—Beijing’s stated framework for crossStrait unification—as a model for Taiwan has long been unpopular among the Taiwan public. However, developments in Hong Kong have intensified the Taiwan public’s opposition to Chinese rule and the “one country, two systems” framework. In 2017, around the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover from the United Kingdom to China, Chen-Shen Yen, an international relations researcher at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, told CNBC, “The Hong Kong experience provided a glimpse of what might happen to Taiwan should the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula apply (to Taiwan). So far, it is not very optimistic.” The erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy in recent years casts further doubt on whether Beijing would abide by any agreement to protect political and civil liberties in Taiwan. (See Chapter 3, Section 4, “China and Hong Kong,” for more information on developments in Hong Kong.)

台灣的一些觀察者以及台灣政府都在關注香港自由和民主的命運。綜觀來看,採用香港「一國兩制」框架——北京所說的兩岸統一框架——作為台灣模式的想法長期以來一直不受台灣民眾的歡迎。然而,香港的發展加劇了台灣民眾反對中國統治和「一國兩制」框架。 2017年,在香港從英國回歸中國20週年之際,台灣國立政治大學國際關係研究中心研究員嚴震生告訴CNBC,「香港經驗讓我們一睹萬一『一國兩制』的框架用在台灣的可能後果。到目前為止,情況並不樂觀。」近年來香港自治權遭受侵蝕的狀況,使人進一步懷疑北京是否會遵守任何保護台灣政治和公民自由的協議。 (有關香港發展的更多訊息,請參閱第3章第4節「中國和香港」。)

Taiwan’s Efforts to Expand Unofficial Partnerships


Despite Beijing’s efforts to constrict Taiwan’s international space, Taipei continues to pursue greater participation in the international community through official diplomatic relations, efforts to expand involvement in international organizations, and initiatives to strengthen economic and unofficial diplomatic partnerships with other countries.


Among the Tsai Administration’s foreign policy priorities has been enhancing unofficial relations with like-minded countries. In addition to the United States, Taipei has undertaken significant efforts to strengthen ties with Japan. These efforts include establishing a dialogue on maritime cooperation and deepening cooperation between Taiwan and Japanese think tanks. Another notable development was the visit to Taiwan in March 2017 by Jiro Akama, Japan’s senior vice minister of internal affairs and communications, to promote Japan as a tourist destination. Vice Minister Akama was the highest level Japanese official to visit Taiwan since the termination of the two sides’ official diplomatic ties in 1972. According to Satoru Mori, professor at Hosei University, the two countries are also trying to integrate Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Policy. Furthermore, Tokyo recently elevated the name of its representative office in Taiwan from the “Interchange Association, Japan” to the “Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association.”


Taipei’s efforts to enhance unofficial ties with Japan and other like-minded countries are growing in response to Beijing’s coercive measures. Following Burkina Faso’s severing of official diplomatic ties with Taiwan, President Tsai said, “We will simply redouble our resolve and continue to engage with the world, and continue establishing more and more substantive, economic and security partnerships with like-minded countries to garner the international community’s acknowledgement and support.” In June 2018, as an example of these growing efforts, Taiwan Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu called for a security dialogue between Japan and Taiwan.

台北正努力加強與日本及其他理念相近國家的非官方關係,以應對北京的強硬措施。在布吉納法索與台灣斷交之後,蔡總統說:「我們……只會更加堅定決心,繼續走向世界,繼續與理念相近國家在經濟與安全層面上建立更多實質夥伴關係,爭取國際社會的認同與支持。」這些日益努力的一個例子是,2018年6月,台灣外交部長吳釗燮(Joseph Wu)呼籲日本與台灣進行《對中安保對話》。


Taiwan is also enhancing cooperation with India, including in the security realm. In September 2018, Reuters reported that senior Indian military officers regularly visit Taiwan, and Taipei has stationed an unofficial military attaché in its representative office in New Delhi. According to Reuters, an unnamed Indian source reported that India is interested in information on Chinese military deployments, saying, “We are dependent on Taiwan because they are watching the Chinese.”


U.S.-Taiwan Unofficial Ties


The Taiwan government has been appreciative of the steps taken by the U.S. government to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan ties, yet it also fears that the Trump Administration could use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in its relationship with Beijing. For its part, Beijing believes that the Trump Administration’s actions in support of Taiwan are efforts to pressure Beijing to make concessions, in particular on issues in the U.S.-China trade relationship.


U.S. pushback on Beijing’s actions: The U.S. Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) expressed concern about Beijing’s expansion of flight route M503 in the Taiwan Strait without consultation with Taipei; the increase in activities by the Chinese military around Taiwan; and China’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador. In remarks in May 2018, AIT Chairman James Moriarty said, “Let me underscore that Beijing’s efforts to alter the status quo are unhelpful and do not contribute to regional stability… The United States urges China to work to restore productive dialogue and to avoid further escalatory or destabilizing moves.” Furthermore, in response to China’s Civil Aviation Administration’s letter to foreign airlines regarding their categorization or depiction of Taiwan on their websites, the White House issued a press statement in which it decried Beijing’s demands as “Orwellian nonsense.” Then, following El Salvador’s break with Taiwan, the White House said, “The El Salvadoran government’s receptiveness to China’s apparent interference in the domestic politics of a Western Hemisphere country is of grave concern to the United States, and will result in a reevaluation of our relationship with El Salvador.” In September, the State Department called the U.S. chiefs of mission in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama back to the United States for “consultations related to recent decisions to no longer recognize Taiwan,” and to engage in discussion with other U.S. officials on “ways in which the United States can support strong, independent, democratic institutions and economies throughout Central America and the Caribbean.”

美國對北京行動的反制:美國國務院和美國在台協會(AIT)對數起兩岸事件表示擔憂:北京未與台北協商就增加台灣海峽M503航路;中國軍隊在台灣周圍的活動增加;中國與多明尼加共和國、布吉納法索和薩爾瓦多建立外交關係。 美國在台協會主席莫健(James Moriarty)在2018年5月的講話中說:「讓我強調,北京試圖改變現狀的行動無助於東亞地區的穩定性…美國敦促中國恢復有效對話,避免進一步升級衝突或破壞穩定的舉措。」此外,針對中國民用航空局就網站上關於台灣的分類或描述,去函外國航空公司,白宮發布了一份新聞聲明,其中譴責北京的要求是「歐威爾式胡言亂語(Orwellian nonsense)」。 在薩爾瓦多與台灣斷交之後,白宮說:「薩爾瓦多政府接受中國顯然干涉西半球國家內政的做法令美國嚴重關切,將導致我們重新評估與薩爾瓦多的關係。」9月,國務院召集駐多明尼加共和國、薩爾瓦多和巴拿馬的大使回到美國討論「最近不再承認台灣的決定」,並與其他美國官員討論「美國如何在中美洲和加勒比地區支持堅強、獨立和民主的制度與經濟。」

High-level visits: In March 2018, President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act into law after it was unanimously passed by both chambers of Congress. The act states that the U.S. government should allow visits to Taiwan by officials at all levels and visits to the United States by high-level Taiwan officials. While the U.S. government has sent officials up to cabinet level to Taiwan, the general practice has been to limit routine visits to Taiwan to midor lower-level U.S. officials and senior U.S. officials who have typically held an economic, cultural, or technical focus. Visits to the Washington, DC area by senior Taiwan officials have been limited. Although the Taiwan Travel Act is nonbinding, its passage and signing by President Trump have strong symbolic significance.


Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) Alex N. Wong, who has been the Department’s lead on the Indo-Pacific strategy, visited Taiwan several days after the signing of the Taiwan Travel Act. In addition to meeting with Taiwan officials—as other EAP officials have done quietly—Mr. Wong’s visit was publicized, and he delivered a public address at an event hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei. President Tsai also spoke at the event. The visit was significant in that past senior State Department officials who visited Taiwan were typically from bureaus with an economic, rather than a political or security, focus. The publicized nature of the event was also unusual. In addition to announcing Mr. Wong’s visit, AIT published the text of his address at the American Chamber of Commerce event on its website. Although Deputy Assistant Secretary Wong’s visit shortly followed the signing of the Taiwan Travel Act, it appears to have been planned well before the legislation was signed.

國務院東亞暨太平洋事務局(EAP)副助理國務卿黃之瀚(Alex N. Wong),負責印度-太平洋戰略,他在台灣旅行法案簽署幾天後訪問台灣。除了與台灣官員會面外──如其他EAP官員那樣悄悄進行──黃先生的訪問是公開的,他在台北美國商會舉辦的一個活動上發表了公開談話。蔡總統也在該活動上發言。這次訪問具有重要意義,因為過去訪問台灣的國務院高級官員通常來自經濟部門,而不是政治或安全部門。該活動公開宣傳的性質也不同尋常。除了公佈黃先生的訪問外,AIT還在其網站上發佈他在台北美國商會活動上的演講文本。儘管亞太副助理國務卿黃之瀚的訪問是在簽署「台灣旅行法」之後不久進行的,但他的訪問似乎在立法簽署之前便已經計劃好了。

President Tsai’s U.S. transits reflect strengthening U.S.-Taiwan ties: In August 2018, on her way to and from Paraguay and Belize, President Tsai transited in Los Angeles and Houston. During those transits, she became the first sitting Taiwan president to visit a U.S. federal government agency (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center) and a Taiwan representative office in the United States (the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office’s Culture Center in Los Angeles). While in Los Angeles, she also delivered public remarks at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, the first time a Taiwan president has spoken publicly in the United States in 15 years.


Global Cooperation and Training Framework enters third year:The most recent event in the Global Cooperation and Training Framework was held in August 2018, when the U.S. and Taiwan governments held a workshop on transnational crime and forensic science. The framework, which the two countries established in June 2015, allows the United States and Taiwan to jointly train experts from the Asia Pacific in areas such as public health, energy, the digital economy, the empowerment of women, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. During a visit to Taiwan in April 2017, Chairman Moriarty said, “We consider [the Global Coopera-tion and Training Framework] one of the signature programs in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, built on our long history of strong cooperation.”


(譯註:譯文部分內容摘自美國在台協會網站〈美國在台協會主席莫健 登革熱/茲卡/屈公病鑑別診斷國際研習營致詞〉,2017年04月25日,AIT 正式資料編號: OT-1707C)

AIT dedicates new office complex: In June 2018, AIT dedicated a new office complex in Taipei. Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Marie Royce attended the ceremony and, in her public remarks about the complex, said, “I also want to acknowledge that it represents much more than steel and glass and concrete. The new office complex is a symbol of the strength and vibrancy of the U.S.-Taiwan partnership in the 21st century.”

AIT新館落成:2018年6月,AIT在台北啟用新辦公大樓。主管教育文化事務的助理國務卿瑪麗·羅伊斯(Marie Royce)出席落成儀式,她在致詞時說:「我也要指出,新館不只是一棟鋼筋水泥和玻璃的建築物,它更象徵著21世紀美台夥伴關係的穩固與活力。」

(譯註:譯文部分內容摘自美國在台協會網站〈教育文化事務助理國務卿瑪麗·羅伊斯美國在台協會新館落成典禮致詞〉AIT 正式資料編號: OT-1813)

Taiwan and the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy: At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vietnam in November 2017, President Trump announced his administration’s policy of promoting a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Since then, the Trump Administration has begun to elaborate on the concept. In his remarks in Taiwan, Deputy Assistant Secretary Wong explained that Taiwan is strengthening the rules-based order—part of the Administration’s concept—by enhancing its legal and regulatory environment and by building relations with other countries in the region through the New Southbound Policy. In a speech in July 2018, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Randall Schriver said, “We do believe Taiwan is a partner in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific and can make valuable contributions.” Taiwan officials, including President Tsai, have expressed their willingness to play a role in the strategy.

台灣和自由開放的印度─太平洋戰略:於2017年11月在越南舉辦的亞太經濟合作會議高峰會,川普總統宣布了其政府推動「自由開放的印度─太平洋」的政策。從那以後,川普政府開始詳述這個想法。亞太副助理國務卿黃之瀚在台灣發表講話時解釋說,台灣正在鞏固區域內以規則為基礎的秩序──「自由開放的印度─太平洋」的部分內容──藉由持續改善台灣的法規環境及透過其新南向政策,加強與區域內各國的關係。國防部亞太安全事務助理國防部長薛瑞福(Randall Schriver)於2018年7月的一次演講中說:「我們確實相信台灣是促進自由開放的印度─太平洋地區的合作夥伴,並且可以做出寶貴貢獻。」台灣官員,包括蔡總統,表示願意在戰略中發揮作用。

(譯註:譯文部分內容參考美國在台協會網站〈美國國務院東亞暨太平洋事務局副助卿黃之瀚 台北美國商會謝年飯演講 台北君悅酒店 2018年3月21日星期三(致詞稿)〉AIT 正式資料編號: OT-1803)

Economics and Trade


Since coming into office, President Tsai has sought to accelerate Taiwan’s economic growth while diversifying trade and economic ties away from an overreliance on China. To achieve these objectives, the Tsai Administration has prioritized efforts to spur innovation in key domestic industries such as green energy, smart machinery, and biotechnology; reform Taiwan’s labor, pension, and judicial systems; and support increased wages and new opportunities for younger workers. Yet even as Taiwan’s economic growth has accelerated due to strong domestic consumption and increased exports, political opposition continues to hinder many of these reform objectives.


In 2017, Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 2.9 percent year-on-year, up from 1.4 percent growth in 2016 and 0.8 percent in 2015. In the first and second quarters of 2018, Taiwan’s GDP expanded 3.1 percent and 3.3 percent year-on-year, respectively, with official government estimates forecasting 2.7 percent yearend growth. Economic growth has been buoyed by domestic demand (increasing around 2.6 percent year-on-year in the first half of the year) and exports (increasing around 6.5 percent year-on-year in the first half of the year). Consumption activity was primarily fueled by increased spending on transportation, recreation and culture activities, and financial services, while export growth was largely due to increased foreign demand for electronic components and machinery.


Taiwan’s improved economic growth figures—as well as recent legislative achievements—have not led to increased employment, but have led to modest improvements in wages. In August 2018, Taiwan’s unemployment rate averaged 3.87 percent, up from 3.76 percent at the beginning of the year. Unemployment remains particularly high among younger workers; as of August 2018, 12.8 percent of workers aged 20 to 24 years were unable to find jobs, up from 11.8 percent at the beginning of the year. Meanwhile, wage growth has accelerated following a decision in September 2017 to raise Taiwan’s monthly minimum wage 4.7 percent to $730. Between January and July 2018, regular employee earnings increased 2.6 percent compared to the same period in 2017. In 2017, wages increased only 1.8 percent year-on-year.

台灣經濟成長數據的改善以及近期的立法成就並未導致就業增加,但薪資水準有所改善。 2018年8月,台灣的失業率平均為3.87%,高於年初的3.76%。青年失業率仍然特別高;截至2018年8月,在年齡20至24歲的工人中,有12.8%無法找到工作,而年初的這一比例為11.8%。與此同時,於2017年9月決定將台灣的最低月薪提高4.7%至730美元後,薪資成長加快。自2018年1月至7月期間,正職雇員的收入與2017年同期相比成長了2.6%。2017年,同期相比,工資僅成長1.8%。

Improved economic growth has not lessened opposition to many of President Tsai’s proposed reforms. The Labor Standard Reform Act,* which came into effect in March 2018, did not fully satisfy either the business community or labor advocates. Similarly, discussions over pension reform remain fraught, with a deeply entrenched constituency—namely from teachers, civil servants, and military veterans, who had generous pension provisions under the previous law—protesting against the policy. However, a majority of Taiwan’s public (64 percent, according to one poll conducted in June 2018) has indicated support for reforming the pension system, which remains one of the most generous in the world despite growing pressures from demographic aging. Taiwan government data indicate that without reform such generous pensions may be unsustainable, with pensions for civil servants estimated to default by 2030, teachers by 2031, and other workers by 2048. In June 2017, Taiwan legislators passed a bill reducing the stipends of civil servants, and in June 2018 passed a bill cutting military veterans’ pensions. Both bills came into effect on July 1, 2018. The unpopularity of President Tsai’s economic reform proposals has contributed to a fall in her overall approval rating, which dropped to 33 percent in June 2018.


Cross-Strait Trade and Investment


Taiwan continues to rely on trade with China as a key driver of its economy: China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, export market, and source of imports. As seen in Figure 1, cross-Strait goods trade totaled $130.8 billion in 2017—a 17.6 percent increase compared to 2016 levels—accounting for 23.8 percent of Taiwan’s total goods trade. Through the first seven months of 2018, Taiwan exported $49.2 billion worth of goods to China (up 14.7 percent from the same period in 2017) and imported $30.8 billion (up 12.5 percent year-on-year).

台灣持續依賴與中國的貿易作為其經濟的主要推動力:中國是台灣最大的貿易夥伴,出口市場和進口來源。如圖1所示,2017年兩岸貨物貿易總額為1308億美元 ——比2016年成長17.6% ——佔台灣商品貿易總額的23.8%。在2018年的前七個月,台灣向中國出口了價值492億美元的商品(比2017年同期成長14.7%),進口額為308億美元(比同期成長12.5%)。

Much like in previous years, Taiwan’s top trade products with China were primarily circuit products and other electrical devices. In 2017, Taiwan’s largest exports to China were electric circuits ($24 billion), liquid crystal display (LCD) devices ($6 billion), and television and radio parts ($3.2 billion). Taiwan’s top imports from China consisted of electric circuits ($9.5 billion), telephones ($4.1 billion), and machine parts ($2.4 billion).

與往年非常相似,台灣與中國的主要貿易產品主要是電路產品和其他電子設備。 2017年,台灣對中國的出口主力是電路(240億美元)、液晶顯示器(LCD)設備(60億美元)、電視和無線電零組件(32億美元)。台灣從中國進口的主要商品包括電子電路(9.5億美元)、通訊設備(41億美元)和機械零組件(24億美元)。

China remains Taiwan’s top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), although investment flows have declined in recent years amid Taiwan’s efforts to diversify economic ties (for more on Taiwan’s efforts to diversify its economic ties through the New Southbound Policy, see “Taiwan’s Economic Growth Initiatives,” later in this section). In 2017, Taiwan invested $9.2 billion in China, down 15.7 percent from 2015 levels, but still comprising 44.4 percent of Taiwan’s total outbound investments. Electronic parts manufacturing made up the largest share (20.7 percent) of Taiwan’s approved FDI in China in 2017, while nonmetal manufacturing (12.2 percent) and financial services and insurance (11.6 percent) accounted for the secondand third-largest shares, respectively. From January to August 2018, Taiwan invested $6 billion in China, a decline of 1 percent from the same period in 2017.

中國仍然是台灣的外資直接投資(FDI)的首選目的地,儘管在台灣努力開闢與更多國經濟聯繫的情況下,對中國投資流量在近幾年有所下降(關於台灣的多樣化努力通過新南向政策的經濟聯繫,請參閱本節後面的內容「台灣經濟成長倡議」)。 2017年,台灣在中國投資92億美元,比2015年下降15.7%,但仍佔台灣對外投資總額的44.4%。 2017年台灣電子零件製造業佔中國對外直接投資的最大份額(20.7%),而非金屬製造業(12.2%)和金融服務業和保險業(11.6%)分別佔第二和第三大份額。從2018年1月到8月,台灣在中國投資60億美元,比2017年同期下降1%。

Meanwhile, Chinese FDI in Taiwan increased from $247.6 million in 2016 to $265.7 million in 2017. Through the first eight months of 2018, Chinese FDI in Taiwan reached $152.6 million, a decline of 9 percent compared to the same period in 2017.


Chinese Economic Coercion


Due to China’s outsized influence on Taiwan’s economy, Beijing’s policies can have a significant impact on Taiwan’s economic development. For instance, recent policy decisions by the Chinese government have contributed to reduced Chinese tourism to Taiwan and led top experts and businesses to leave Taiwan for more lucrative opportunities in China.


Reducing tourism to Taiwan: In 2017, the Tourism Bureau in Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communications reported that the number of visitors to Taiwan from China dropped 22 percent year-on-year after declining 16 percent year-on-year in 2016. The decline is due in part to a 2016 change in Chinese travel laws, which requires leaders of Taiwan-bound tour groups to obtain a special license. In 2017, China also reduced the number of Chinese students permitted to study in Taiwan by half, approving only 1,000 applications for the 2017–2018 academic year (down from 2,136 the previous year). Although Taiwan still saw a record number of international visitors in 2017 (with more than 10.7 million tourists coming from around the world), the declining number of visitors from China has impacted profits in Taiwan’s tourism industry.

減少對台灣的旅遊業:2017年,台灣交通運輸部旅遊局報告指出,2016年台灣遊客數量與同期相比下降22%,而2016年與同期相比下降16%。部分原因是2016年中國旅行法的變更,要求到台灣的旅行團的領隊須獲得特別許可。 2017年,中國還將獲准在台灣學習的中國學生人數砍半,僅批准2017-2018學年的1,000份申請(比前一年的2,136份少)。儘管台灣在2017年的國際遊客人數仍然創下新高(來自世界各地的遊客超過1070萬),但來自中國的遊客人數下降影響了台灣旅遊業的利潤。

In 2015, Chinese tourists in Taiwan spent an average of $228 per day (the second-highest daily expenditure behind tourists from Japan). After the new travel regulations were implemented, Chinese tourists’ daily expenditures dropped to $208 per day in 2016 and $184 per day in 2017. In particular, Chinese tourists’ average daily spending on retail and shopping in Taiwan has declined, dropping from $157 per day in 2015 to $136 per day in 2016.


Many local Taiwan businesses and shops only receive a fraction of the total money spent by Chinese tourists because most of the spending goes to the Chinese tour organizers. Although this has lessened the economic impact of the decline in tourism from China, Taiwan shopkeepers and other tourism-related businesses still feel the effects of Beijing’s new tour group regulations. In 2016, some 20,000 tourism sector workers staged a protest demanding Taiwan’s government make efforts to boost tourism in response to reduced tourism from China.


Attracting workers from Taiwan: In February 2018, the Chinese government unveiled a package of 31 “incentives” to attract workers and students from Taiwan, including tax breaks and subsidies for high-tech companies, research grants for academics, and promises to allow Taiwan companies to bid for government infrastructure projects. The academic community in Taiwan characterizes these efforts as an attempt to “dig out [Taiwan’s] roots.” Even before the 31 incentives plan, many workers from Taiwan were pursuing opportunities in China. In 2015, 58 percent (420,000 people) of all people from Taiwan working abroad were based in China. The exodus of talent creates another source of pressure Beijing can impose against Taipei as it threatens to hollow out Taiwan’s economy. On a Commission trip to Taipei, Kristy Hsu, director of the Taiwan ASEAN Studies Center, indicated that the 31 incentives alone will have limited impact on Taiwan’s economy. However, if China further increases incentives for Taiwan citizens and businesses to relocate to China, it could have a real impact on Taiwan’s ability to retain talent. Beijing continues to encourage Taiwan citizens to work or study in China.* In August, the Chinese government removed a policy requiring Taiwan citizens to hold a permit to work in China. Effective September 2018, Taiwan citizens who are working or studying in China can also apply for a residence card that conveys benefits related to employment, insurance, housing, and travel.

吸引台灣工作者:2018年2月,中國政府公布了一系列共31項的「激勵措施」,吸引台灣工作者和學生,包括對高科技公司的減稅和補貼,為學者提供研究經費,並承諾允許台灣公司競標政府基礎建設項目。台灣學術界將這些措施描述為「(將台灣)連根拔起」。即使在31個激勵措施實施之前,台灣的許多工作者已在中國尋求工作機會。 2015年,赴海外工作的台灣勞工中,有58%(420,000人)在中國工作。台灣人才外流可能成為北京對台北施加壓力的另一個來源,因為這有可能動搖台灣經濟的根基。在本委員會某次造訪台北時,中華經濟研究院台灣東南亞國家協會研究中心主任徐遵慈表示,31項激勵措施本身對台灣經濟的影響有限。但是,如果中國進一步擴大鼓勵台灣公民和企業移轉到中國,它可能會對台灣留住人才的能力產生實際影響。北京繼續鼓勵台灣公民到中國工作或學習。8月,中國政府取消了一項要求在中國的台灣公民持有工作許可證的政策。從2018年9月開始,在中國工作或學習的台灣公民也可以申請港澳台居民居住證,以獲得有關就業、保險、住房和旅行的福利。

Chinese Firms Could Sideline Taiwan in Global ICT Supply Chains


Taiwan’s information and communication technology (ICT) firms are facing rising competition in global supply chains as a consequence of China’s efforts to develop its own ICT industry. China aims to become a global leader in semiconductors by 2030 and uses government-backed funds such as the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund—which has raised $41 billion to date—to support the development of its ICT industry. Although Taiwan still holds an edge in precision manufacturing and cutting-edge ICT, Chinese investments in the industry could lead Taiwan firms’ share of the market to decline. To date, however, these fears have not been realized; in 2017, Taiwan’s industry revenue increased to $81 billion, up 0.5 percent from 2016, and is expected to reach $85.8 billion in 2018.

由於中國努力發展自己的ICT產業,台灣的訊息和通信技術(ICT)公司正面臨著全球供應鏈日益激烈的競爭。中國的目標是到2030年成為半導體領域的全球領導者,並使用政府支持的基金,如國家集成電路產業投資基金 —— 迄今為止已籌資410億美元 —— 以支持其ICT行業的發展。雖然台灣在精密製造和尖端訊息通信技術方面仍佔據優勢,但中國對該行業的投資可能會導致台灣企業在市場中所佔比重下降。然而,迄今為止,這些擔憂尚未成真; 2017年,台灣ICT產業營收增加至810億美元,比2016年成長0.5%,預計2018年將達到858億美元。

Although growing competition with Taiwan’s ICT firms is a natural consequence—rather than intent—of China’s technological development, Chinese firms are also resorting to coercive measures to gain technological know-how from Taiwan firms. In a meeting with the Commission, John Deng, Minister without Portfolio in the Taiwan government and Taiwan’s lead trade official, said “China still comes to Taiwan to steal our talent and intellectual property,” especially in the semiconductor industry. Taiwan’s Trade Secrets Act was amended in 2013 to address trade secret theft by China,* but Minister Deng indicates the law’s increased penalties still have not deterred Chinese actors.


Taiwan’s Economic Growth Initiatives


Taipei has prioritized economic initiatives aimed at strengthening key engines of its economy and diversifying its economic and trade partnerships beyond China. At home, Taiwan is pursuing its “5+2” Innovative Industries program to create new, profitable businesses in key economic sectors, and a Forward-looking Infrastructure Program to develop the infrastructure needed to ensure stable energy supplies and attract top-level talent. Abroad, Taiwan prioritizes the New Southbound Policy, which is aimed at diversifying Taiwan’s economic ties beyond China to countries in Asia and Oceania.

台灣政府已優先採取了能夠加強其經濟關鍵的舉措,並增加其經貿合作夥伴數量。在國內,台灣正在推行其「5 + 2」產業創新計畫,以在關鍵經濟領域創造新的盈利產業,以及推行前瞻基礎建設計畫,以發展確保穩定的能源供應和吸引頂級人才所需的基礎設施。在國際方面,台灣將重心放在新南向政策,旨在與中國以外的亞洲和大洋洲國家發展經貿合作。

“5+2” Innovative Industries program: Taiwan is attempting to shift its industrial base away from manufacturing and toward high-value-added, innovative, and service-oriented businesses that will spur job creation. Under the “5+2” Innovative Industries program, Taiwan is seeking to develop five pillar industries (green energy, defense, the Internet of Things, biotechnology, and smart precision machinery) and two auxiliary sectors (high-value agriculture and the “circular economy”*). The initiative is backed by Taiwan’s Industrial Innovation and Transformation Fund, which will invest $3.3 billion to develop new technologies and promote innovation in pillar industries. According to Roy Lee, deputy executive director at the Taiwan World Trade Organization Center and Regional Trade Agreement Center, the initiative is also aimed at creating local ecosystems to encourage Taiwan companies to stay in Taiwan rather than moving facilities to China.

「5+2」產業創新計畫:台灣正試圖將其工業基礎從製造業轉向高附加價值、創新、和服務型企業,以創造就業機會。在「5 + 2」產業創新計畫下,台灣正在發展五大支柱產業(綠能科技、國防產業、物聯網(亞洲矽谷)、生醫產業和智慧精密機械)和兩個輔助部門(高價值農業(新農業)和「循環經濟」*)。該計畫得到國發基金編列的「產業創新轉型基金」支持,將投資1000億台幣用於開發新技術和促進核心產業的創新。根據台灣世界貿易組織中心和區域貿易協定中心副執行長李淳(Roy Lee)的說法,該倡議的重點之一是要創造在地的經濟生態系統,鼓勵台灣公司留在台灣,而不是將設施轉移到中國。

To date, the “5+2” program has focused on investments in artificial intelligence (AI), with the government approving a plan in January 2018 to invest $1.2 billion over the next four years in AI. Under the plan, funds will be dedicated toward fostering and recruiting top AI talent, creating an international AI innovation center, and promoting new regulations to facilitate AI testing and verification. As part of the program, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs is also working with the Ministry of Finance to provide tax incentives to help small and medium firms incorporate digital production systems into their facilities.


Forward-looking Infrastructure Program: The program, which began in July 2017, is aimed at improving Taiwan’s infrastructure over the next 30 years. It includes $13.9 billion in funding over the first four years for the development of eight areas: railway projects, water environments, green energy infrastructure, digital infrastructure, regional development, child care facilities, agriculture, and human resources infrastructure. The program seeks to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation, spur innovation, and create a more competitive business environment.


New Southbound Policy: Taiwan’s government is seeking to reduce Taiwan’s reliance on China by expanding economic, educational, and cultural ties with ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand, and seven South Asian countries. Under the New Southbound Policy, “Taiwan desks” will be opened in target countries and overseen by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs to coordinate local resources and cluster Taiwan investors abroad. The policy also creates special loans for exports under Taiwan’s Export-Import Bank, increases branches of Taiwan banks in target countries, and promotes technology collaboration and agricultural technology assistance abroad. To further integrate Taiwan with target countries, the New Southbound Policy also prioritizes forming and updating bilateral investment agreements. Ms. Hsu explained to the Commission that the policy prioritizes soft power diplomacy, with the Taiwan government allocating resources to programs that promote tourism, attract foreign students, and promote think tank exchanges.

新南向政策:台灣政府正尋求透過擴大與東協國家、澳大利亞、紐西蘭和七個南亞國家的經濟、教育和文化聯繫,來減少台灣對中國的依賴。根據新南向政策,政府將在目標國家設置「台灣投資窗口」(Taiwan Desk),並由台灣經濟部監督,以協調當地資源,並將台灣投資者在國外得以形成群聚。該政策還為台灣的進出口貿易銀行(正式名稱:中國輸出入銀行)創造了特殊貸款,增加目標國家台灣銀行的分支機構,並促進國外的技術合作和農業技術援助。為了進一步將台灣與目標國家融為一體,新南向政策還優先制定和更新雙邊投資協議。徐女士向(美國國會)委員會解釋說,該政策優先考慮軟實力外交,台灣政府將資源分配給促進旅遊,吸引外國學生和促進智庫交流等項目。

To date, the New Southbound Policy has led to mixed results fostering increased trade between Taiwan and target countries (see Table 1). A 2018 study by the National Bureau of Asian Research found that in 2016 (the first year of the policy’s implementation), Taiwan’s outbound investment to seven ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) reached a record $3.5 billion, versus $9.1 billion invested in China. By comparison, Taiwan invested $10.4 billion in China in 2015, while investments in the ASEAN countries totaled only $2.6 billion. Target countries’ tourism to Taiwan also increased; in 2017, the number of visitors to Taiwan from Southeast Asia was up 29.4 percent year-on-year (2.1 million visitors), and the number of visitors from Australia and New Zealand was up 9.9 percent yearon-year (105,000 visitors).

迄今為止,新南向政策為台灣與目標國家之間的貿易,帶來一些不同的效果(見表1)。美國智名的智庫「國家亞洲研究局」(NBR)2018年的一項研究發現,在新南向政策實行的第一年,即2016年,台灣對七個東協國家(柬埔寨、印尼、馬來西亞、菲律賓、新加坡、泰國和越南)的對外投資達到了創紀錄的35億美元,而在中國的投資額為91億美元。相比之下,台灣在2015年在中國的投資額為104億美元,而在東協國家的投資總額僅為26億美元。目標國家對台灣的旅遊業也有所增加; 2017年,來自東南亞的台灣遊客數量較去年成長29.4%(訪客人數210萬人次),澳大利亞和紐西蘭遊客數量較去年成長9.9%(訪客人數105,000人次)。

Taiwan’s total trade with ASEAN countries reached $86.1 billion in 2017, lower than 2013 ($88.2 billion) and 2014 ($91.3 billion). Through the first seven months of 2018, Taiwan’s exports to ASEAN countries increased 6.1 percent compared to the same period in 2017. Because increased investment is not creating a proportional increase in export orders for Taiwan businesses in ASEAN countries, Taipei may prioritize efforts to negotiate new economic cooperation agreements to boost trading volumes.


Table 1: Taiwan Share of Global Trade and Investment Ties with Select Partners, 2010–July 2018


U.S.-Taiwan Economic and Trade Relations


In 2017, U.S.-Taiwan economic ties were defined primarily by the trading relationship, with overall goods trade increasing relative to 2016 levels on the strength of trade in electronic products. To foster increased engagement, Taiwan is seeking to expand ties with U.S. businesses, particularly in the technology sector. In June 2018, Taiwan sent the year’s largest foreign delegation (comprising 120 representatives from 60 industries) to the U.S. government’s annual SelectUSA Investment Summit promoting increased foreign investment in the United States. Despite these positive developments, no progress has been made securing commitments on a few longstanding issues such as market access for U.S. pork and beef products.

2017年,美台經濟聯繫主要由貿易關係決定,隨著電子產品貿易走強,整體商品貿易較2016年成長。為了促進增加貿易活動,台灣正在尋求擴展與美國企業的關係,特別是在科技產業。 2018年6月,美國政府主辦一年一度的「選擇美國」投資高峰會(SlectUSA Investment Summit),推廣外資在美國境內的投資,台灣方面派出該年度規模最大的外國代表團(包括來自60個產業的120名代表)參加。儘管取得了這些積極進展,但在確保一些長期問題上的承諾方面沒有取得任何進展,例如向美國豬肉和牛肉產品開放市場。

According to U.S. Census data, bilateral goods trade between the United States and Taiwan totaled $68.2 billion in 2017—an increase of 4.3 percent year-on-year—making Taiwan the United States’ eleventh-largest trading partner. In 2017, U.S. goods exports to Taiwan fell slightly to $25.8 billion (down only 0.8 percent from 2016 levels), while U.S. imports from Taiwan increased 8.1 percent yearon-year to $42.5 billion. The leading U.S. exports to Taiwan were semiconductor and electronic components ($3.8 billion), industrial machinery ($3.6 billion), and aerospace products and parts ($3 billion). U.S. goods imports from Taiwan were led by semiconductor and electronic components ($6.2 billion), telecommunications equipment ($3.6 billion), and computer equipment ($2.8 billion).

根據美國人口普查數據,2017年美國與台灣的雙邊貨物貿易總額為682億美元 —— 較去年成長4.3%,使台灣成為美國的第11大貿易夥伴。 2017年,美國對台出口略有下降至258億美元(較2016年水準僅下降0.8%),美國向台進口較去年成長8.1%至425億美元。美國對台出口的主要產品是半導體和電子元件(38億美元)、工業機械(36億美元)、航空航太產品和零件(30億美元)。從台灣進口的美國商品以半導體和電子元件(62億美元)、電信設備(36億美元)和電腦設備(28億美元)為首。

The United States and Taiwan have deepened cooperation in high-tech industries in recent years, forging business and government connections in next-generation technologies. For example, in January 2018, Microsoft Corporation launched a $33 million investment to create an AI research and development center in Taiwan. The center will collaborate with Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Education to develop “intelligent input, audience intent recognition, and AI vertical industrial integration” technologies. Taiwan’s National Development Council also established an Asian Silicon Valley Development Agency in September 2016 to promote the growth of tech startups and connect them with firms in Silicon Valley and around the world.


Taiwan and the United States continue to discuss bilateral economic issues primarily through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) established in 1994. However, progress on certain issues discussed in TIFA talks between the United States and Taiwan has been stalled for many years. Outstanding issues in the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship include intellectual property rights protection, trade barriers, and investment opportunities, as well as a decade-long dispute over U.S. pork and beef imports. Intellectual property concerns center on online copyright infringement; a 2017 white paper by the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei noted that pirated content is prevalent in Taiwan and highlighted the need for an improved legal framework to prosecute copyright infringers.


The disputes over beef and pork center on Taiwan’s unwillingness to fully open its pork and beef market to U.S. producers due to U.S. farmers’ use of ractopamine, a feed additive that produces leaner meat products. Taiwan, along with the European Union and China, has banned the use of ractopamine due to health and food safety concerns. U.S. policymakers and trade negotiators view Taiwan’s ban on ractopamine as a protectionist measure, and have criticized the policy as being “not based upon science.” In 2012, Taiwan loosened some restrictions on residual levels of ractopamine in some U.S. beef imports, but continues to enforce a ban on certain U.S. beef products and all U.S. pork products. A Taiwan government official told the Commission that U.S. pork products still do not meet Taiwan’s health and food safety standards, indicating any breakthrough will require more dialogue between Taiwan and the United States.


Cross-Strait Military and Security Issues


The primary objective of China’s military deployments and posture directed at Taiwan is to pressure Taipei into eventual unification with Beijing and, if that fails, to subjugate Taiwan through military action. Since Taiwan remains the PLA’s “main strategic direction,”* one of the principal objectives of China’s military modernization program is to build the necessary force and prepare operational plans for a forceful takeover of the island.


Increasing PLA Exercises to Intimidate Taipei


The scope and frequency of PLA training activities near Taiwan have expanded and intensified in recent years. In addition to gathering intelligence and enhancing the PLA’s preparations for Taiwan-related military contingencies, these activities are also intended to coerce Taiwan into agreeing to Beijing’s preferred terms for crossStrait relations and eventual unification. A Taiwan government official noted to the Commission in May 2018 that PLA exercises near to or targeting Taiwan are intended to influence Taiwan voters to not vote for the DPP. This official added that Beijing also seeks to “deter U.S. determination to rescue Taiwan.” These activities are primarily comprised of the following:


• PLA Air Force training flights: As part of a trend of increasing long-distance over-water training on China’s periphery, the PLA Air Force has been conducting training flights near Taiwan. At least twelve of these flights have occurred since November 2017 alone (for a depiction of these flight routes, see map in Chapter 2, Section 1, “Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs”). These flights began with transits from China over the Bashi Channel (between Taiwan and the Philippines) and the Miyako Strait (to the northeast of Taiwan between the southwestern Japanese islands of Miyako and Okinawa) to the Western Pacific for the first time in 2015. A new flight path was established in November 2016 when PLA Air Force aircraft flew around Taiwan, first flying south of Taiwan over the Bashi Channel, then flying north, and returning to China over the Miyako Strait. Since then, flights following this path or its reverse have become a regular occurrence.


• Aircraft carrier transits of the Taiwan Strait: In 2018, China’s only operational aircraft carrier sailed through the Taiwan Strait twice as part of its training activities. Following its commissioning, the carrier transited the strait for the first time in November 2013 and again the next month. After not transiting the strait for several years, it did so three times in 2017. It is worth noting that passing through the Taiwan Strait is the most direct route for the carrier to reach the South China Sea for training, and the carrier has stayed on China’s side of the center line. Nonetheless, these transits carry significant symbolic meaning, particularly in the context of China’s actions on multiple fronts to pressure and intimidate Taiwan.


• Exercises in the Taiwan Strait: In April 2018, the PLA Navy held its first live-fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait since 2015. In July, the PLA Navy conducted an amphibious landing exercise near the Taiwan island of Kinmen as part of an international amphibious landing competition that saw participation from Iran, Russia, Sudan, and Venezuela.


A Shifting Cross-Strait Military Balance


As the Commission has noted in past reports, the cross-Strait military balance has shifted toward China and continues to shift even further in China’s direction. The PLA possesses many quantitative and qualitative military advantages over the Taiwan military and is currently capable of conducting a range of military campaigns against Taiwan short of a full invasion of the island.


• Missiles: The PLA Rocket Force has approximately 1,200 shortrange ballistic missiles and 200–500 ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles. A preponderance of China’s shortrange ballistic missiles is deployed across from Taiwan. The primary purpose of the majority of these missiles is to intimidate Taiwan into submitting to Beijing’s political objectives and, if that fails, to force submission through a military campaign to destroy Taiwan’s command and control infrastructure, radar sites, air defense, ports, and airfields. Although it has not greatly expanded in size since the late 2000s, China’s shortrange ballistic missile arsenal has become more lethal with the introduction of new missile variants with improved accuracies and warheads.

導彈(Missiles):解放軍火箭軍擁有大約1,200枚短程彈道導彈和200枚至500枚陸射對地攻擊巡航導彈。中國短程彈道導彈大多部署在台灣對面。大多這些導彈的主要目的是恫嚇台灣屈服於北京的政治目標,如果失敗,則透過摧毀台灣指揮中心、基礎設施、雷達站、飛彈防禦、港口和機場之軍事行動逼降。雖然自2009年以來(譯註:原文是「since the late 2000s」),規模沒有大幅擴充,但因改良精準度與彈頭的新型導彈,中國的短程彈道導彈武器庫變得更加致命。

• Aircraft: The PLA Air Force and Navy have more than 2,000 combat aircraft, of which approximately 600 are modern. Fewer than 330 of Taiwan’s combat aircraft are modern. As part of the PLA’s efforts to further enhance the capabilities of its fleet of combat aircraft, the Su-35 fighter entered service with the PLA Air Force in 2018. The Su-35, with its advanced avionics and targeting and passive electronically scanned array radar systems, will improve China’s counter-air and strike capabilities. China has received 14 Su-35s from Russia and will receive the remaining 10 that were ordered by the end of 2018.


• Ships: The PLA Navy has more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, and missile-armed patrol craft, in addition to China’s highly capable coast guard and maritime militia. Taiwan, on the other hand, has 92 naval combatants, comprising four submarines—two of which are only used for training—and 88 surface ships.185 As China’s efforts to improve its navy continue, its new ships are increasingly modern‡ and feature advanced weaponry making them capable of conducting operations in more than one warfare area. (See Chapter 2, Section 2, “China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States,” for more information on developments in Chinese military modernization.)



Intensifying Political Warfare Efforts


In addition to its military modernization and intimidation, Beijing is carrying out extensive United Front work§ and other political warfare activities against Taiwan, including supporting opposition political parties and spreading disinformation. These activities are intended to build alliances between individuals and groups within Taiwan and the CCP, and undermine the Tsai Administration and Taiwan’s democracy in general.


In August 2017, Peter Mattis, research fellow at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, wrote that “Beijing’s effort to shape or even destabilize [Taiwan] society itself through United Front work is intensifying. The aim, according to several [Taiwan] interlocutors, is to create a ‘fake civil society’ that can be used against Taiwan’s democratic system.” He added that his “recent discussions in Taiwan indicate that covert Chinese activities have increased in scope, sophistication, and intensity. For the first time in many years, Taiwan’s national security officials see change rather than continuity as a hallmark of Beijing’s intelligence and subversive operations.” In his testimony to the Commission, Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute, explained that CCP United Front work against Taiwan is focused on “10 constituencies that include grass-roots villages, youth, students, Chinese spouses, aboriginals, pro-China political parties and groups, religious organizations, distant relatives, fishermen’s associations, and retired generals.”

2017年8月,共產主義受害者紀念基金會(Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation)研究員彼得.馬提斯(Peter Mattis)寫道:「北京正在強化藉由統戰工作以形塑甚至破壞台灣社會本身的工作。據幾位[台灣]對話者說,其試圖建立『假公民社會』來對付台灣的民主制度。」他補充說,他「最近在台灣的討論表明,中國提高(在台)地下活動的範圍、複雜度與強度。多年來,台灣國安官員首次見到北京對台情報與顛覆活動不再延用過去多年的手法,出現了顯著變化。」華府智庫全球台灣研究中心(GTI)執行長蕭良淇也在國會聽證會指出,中共對台統戰聚焦「草根社群、青年、學生、中國配偶、原住民、親中政黨與團體、宗教機構、陸人在台遠親、漁業協會及退休將領等10個選民範圍。」

(譯註:譯文部分內容參考、摘自中央社〈美報告指中國在台散布假消息 意圖建立假公民社會〉2018/11/15)

In July 2017, Taiwan’s Liberty Times reported, based on Taiwan government information, that “Chinese influence” was involved in protests and the spread of disinformation against the Tsai Administration’s pension reforms. In addition, that year there were several instances of individuals with ties to organized crime and pro-unification organizations protesting and even engaging in violence against individuals whose views run counter to Beijing’s. Furthermore, in 2017, J. Michael Cole, chief editor of the Taiwan Sentinel website, wrote that China “is now using bots, various social media (e.g., LINE, WeChat) and content farms (also known as content mills) to saturate Taiwan with pro-Beijing agitprop.”

2017年7月,台灣自由時報報導,根據台灣政府情報,「中國影響力」涉及參與抗議活動並散佈相關不實訊息來反對蔡政府的年金改革。那一年也有數起組織犯罪、支持統一組織等相關份子與反對北京觀點的人士發生暴力傷害事件。此外,2017年,台灣守望網站(Taiwan Sentinel)主編寇謐將(J. Michael Cole)寫道,中國正利用聊天機器人、各種社群媒體(如LINE、微信)及內容農場,在台灣散佈支持北京的文宣資訊。

(譯註:譯文部分內容參考、摘自中央社〈寇謐將:中共持續對台造謠攻勢應密切注意〉2017/08/05 )

Beijing’s Espionage against Taiwan


Beijing’s aggressive intelligence activities against Taiwan pose a threat to Taiwan’s security and to the security of U.S. military information and equipment to which Taiwan has access. In June 2018, Taiwan prosecutors indicted the spokesperson of Taiwan’s New Party and two executives of the party’s youth wing on charges of attempting to obtain classified materials from active and retired Taiwan military personnel on behalf of the Chinese government. William Stanton, former director of AIT and current director of Taiwan’s National Tsinghua University’s Center for Asia Policy, said in 2013 that cases of Chinese espionage against Taiwan “have been harmful not only because of the potential loss of unknown quantities of classified information, but also because their success and frequency serves to undermine U.S. confidence in security cooperation with Taiwan.” However, while recognizing Beijing’s intelligence successes, David Major, former director of counterintelligence, intelligence, and security programs at the National Security Council, testified to the Com-mission in 2016 that “if the [United States] begins to slow down or stop the transfer of needed technology and information with Taiwan for fear of espionage loss then the PRC wins and Taiwan is doomed.”

北京藉以對付台灣的激進情報活動威脅台灣的安全,也對台灣使用的美國軍事情報與設備構成威脅。2018年6月,台灣檢察機關以涉嫌為中國政府自台灣現役和退役軍人手中獲取機密資料為由,起訴台灣新黨發言人及該黨青年委員會兩名主管。 AIT前任處長,台灣國立清華大學亞洲政策中心現任主任司徒文(William Stanton)於2013年表示,數起中國對付台灣的間諜活動「是有害的,不僅因為可能丟失了未知數量的機密訊息,而且因為間諜活動的頻繁程度以及成功,也打擊了美國對於台灣在安全合作上的信心。」然而,在承認北京情報工作成功的同時,美國國家安全會議反情報、情報和安全項目(counterintelligence, intelligence, and security programs at the National Security Council)前主任大衛·梅傑(David Major)於2016年向委員會作證,「如果[美國]因為擔心間諜活動造成損失,開始減緩或停止向台灣轉移所需的技術和訊息,那麼中共取得勝利,台灣在劫難逃。」


In the face of the Chinese espionage threat, the Taiwan government and military have implemented measures to impede Chinese intelligence activities. Mr. Mattis wrote in 2014 that “Taiwan has made several substantial efforts to improve security—including trip reporting and routine polygraphs for personnel with sensitive access as well as boosting its counterintelligence staff—and serious offenders can … receive heavy prison sentences.” The Taiwan government has recently begun requiring government personnel to receive government approval before transiting through an airport in China. Taiwan civil servants are already required to obtain approval before traveling to China.


Taiwan Takes Steps to Enhance Security


Faced with a growing threat from PLA modernization and Beijing’s intensifying political warfare activities, Taipei has responded by taking a number of significant new steps to improve its ability to defend against a Chinese military attack and other threatening activities. Taiwan’s recent efforts have included the following:


Developing asymmetric capabilities and a new defense concept:


Taipei marked a fundamental departure from its previous defense strategies with the announcement of a new Overall Defense Concept, which operationalizes Taiwan’s broader defense strategy, now described as “resolute defense, multi-layered deterrence.”* Unveiled in December 2017, the new concept seeks to emphasize the development of asymmetric capabilities and tactics to capitalize on Taiwan’s defensive advantages, enhance resilience, and exploit the weaknesses of the PLA. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense, the characteristics of the equipment it is seeking to support its new approach are “mobility, stealth, fast speed, low cost, abundance, minimum damage, and high effectiveness.” The new strategy focuses on three areas: (1) preservation of warfighting capability, (2) pursuing decisive victory in the littoral area, and (3) annihilating the enemy on the beach. Notably, the Taiwan military incorporated the concept into this year’s Han Kuang exercise, Taiwan’s most important annual military exercise. During the exercise, Taiwan integrated a number of new components, including Taiwan Coast Guard ships exercising together with the Taiwan Navy, embedding personnel from Taiwan technology companies in Taiwan Army units to operate unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and target acquisition, incorporating civilian construction personnel and equipment into runway repair, and using civilian telecommunication technology to maintain command and control in the face of attacks. In July 2018, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced plans to introduce month-long training exercises involving all the military services once per quarter, which would mark an increase in training.

台北背離先前的防禦戰略,宣布新的整體防衛構想,實施台灣更廣大的防禦戰略,現在稱為「防衛固守,重層嚇阻。」此戰略於2017年12月公佈¹,新構想旨在強調發展不對稱戰力與戰術,以借助台灣的防禦優勢、增強恢復戰力速度和利用解放軍的弱點。根據台灣國防部的說法,用來支持新戰略的裝備特點是「機動、隱匿、快速、價廉、量多、損小、效高。」新戰略側重於三個方面: (1)戰力防護,(2)濱海決勝,(3)灘岸殲敵。值得注意的是,台灣軍方將這一概念納入了今年台灣最重要的年度軍事演習──漢光演習。演習期間,台灣整合了許多新組件,包括與台灣海軍共同執行操演的台灣海巡署艦艇,以及將台灣科技公司的人員納入台灣陸軍(的軍勤編組),操作無人機以進行監視和目標標定,並將民間營造廠員工與設備納入(軍編)進入跑道搶修,以及在面對攻擊情況下,運用民營(電信公司的)電信技術維持指揮與控制(的暢通)。2018年7月,台灣國防部宣布(announced )計劃每季度開展一次涉及所有軍事服務的為期一個月的訓練演習,這將標誌著訓練的增加。

(譯註:譯文部分內容參考國防部發布〈「國軍107年『漢光34 號演習』規劃」新聞參考資料〉,107年4月24日。資料來源:中華民國國防部網站。)
(譯註:譯文部分內容參考中央社記者游凱翔〈反制共軍文攻武嚇 國軍108年起擬恢復戰備月〉2018/07/29)

Increasing defense spending: In August 2018, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan submitted a budget to the Taiwan legislature that included an increase of approximately 4.3 percent for the defense budget. To support implementation of the new defense concept, the 2019 budget includes a request to fund the acquisition of small fast-attack missile craft, which provide Taiwan with an important defensive advantage against a PLA naval blockade or amphibious assault. Nevertheless, China’s large defense expenditures are a major challenge for Taiwan, and China’s official defense budget has now ballooned to a size about 15 times Taiwan’s. Even with robust spending, Taiwan cannot match China’s defense budget, which places an even greater premium on Taiwan’s development of asymmetric and effective defensive capabilities.*


(譯註:翻譯內容部分參考中央社記者游凱翔〈建構不對稱戰力 海軍編316億造微型飛彈突擊艇〉,2018/08/31)

Elevating Taiwan’s defense industry: A key pillar of the Tsai Administration’s defense policy has been enhancing the government’s support for Taiwan’s defense industry with a focus on aerospace, shipbuilding, and cybersecurity. In May 2018, the Taiwan Defense Industry Development Association co-hosted the Taiwan-United States Defense Business Forum with the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council in Taiwan to explore opportunities for collaboration between Taiwan and U.S. defense companies.

提升台灣國防工業:蔡政府國防政策的關鍵支柱是加強政府對台灣國防工業的支持,重點是航空航天、造船和網絡安全。2018年5月,台灣國防產業發展協會(Taiwan National Defense Industry Development Association)與美台商業協會(U.S.-Taiwan Business Council)共同在台灣主辦美台國防產業論壇,探討台美國防產業合作的機會。

Countering Beijing’s interference and disinformation: In September 2018, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau publicly announced it had established a Big Data and Public Opinion Task Force in 2015 in concert with Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice to monitor the spread of disinformation on social media, especially false news stories from the PRC that aim to manipulate public opinion in Taiwan. Another measure Taipei has taken to counter PRC interference is to create webpages on government websites dedicated to dispelling rumors and countering false information. Taipei is also conducting investigations of ties between Beijing and groups in Taiwan. In September 2017, the Taiwan government announced it was launching an investigation into alleged manipulation of organized crime groups in Taiwan by Beijing.

打擊北京的干涉與不實訊息:2018年9月,台灣的國家安全局公開宣布,與台灣法務部合作,已於2015年成立了大數據輿情小組,以監控社交媒體上不實訊息的傳播,尤其是來自中國的虛假新聞報導旨在操縱台灣的輿論。為打擊中國干涉,台北採取的另一項措施是,在政府網站上製作專門用於化解謠言和打擊不實訊息的網頁。台北也在調查北京與台灣團體之間的聯繫。 2017年9月,台灣政府宣布對北京涉嫌操控台灣組織犯罪集團的事件展開調查。

(譯註:譯文內容參考中央社記者劉麗榮〈傳加強蒐報訊息 國安局:掌握輿情供政府參考〉2018/09/14)

Taiwan Military Modernization


Taiwan has sought to enhance its military capabilities as part of its evolving defense strategy to defeat a PLA campaign targeting the island. Advanced antiship cruise missiles, air defense missiles, and fast attack and stealthy catamaran-style patrol ships are among the newest platforms and weapons systems Taiwan has produced. Some of the developments in Taiwan’s procurement of domestic military equipment in 2018 include the following:

作為逐步發展的防衛戰略的一部分,台灣企圖增強軍事戰力以擊敗解放軍的對台戰役。先進的反艦巡弋飛彈( antiship cruise missiles)、防空飛彈、匿蹤快速攻擊雙船體巡邏艦是台灣建造的最新平台和武器系統。台灣2018年採購國內軍事裝備的一些發展包括:

• Missile corvette: Taiwan is accelerating the production of the TUO CHIANG class of catamaran-style missile corvettes, the first of which was commissioned in March 2015. Taiwan’s Lung Teh Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., will build a total of 12 of these ships. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recently announced that 8 of the remaining 11 will be completed by 2025 rather than the original target window of 2030 to 2032. The corvette has a reduced radar cross section, longer endurance, and better sea-keeping ability than Taiwan’s other patrol ships. The first corvette is equipped with antiship cruise missiles, two torpedo tubes, and a towed sonar array. These features will enhance the lethality of Taiwan’s anti-surface and antisubmarine forces in a potential cross-Strait conflict.

•飛彈巡邏艦:台灣正在加速建造沱江級雙船體飛彈巡邏艦,其中第一艘於2015年3月投入服役。台灣的龍德造船工業股份有限公司(Lung Teh Shipbuilding Co., Ltd.)將總共建造12艘沱江級巡邏艦。台灣國防部最近宣布,其餘11艘中的8艘將於2025年完成,而非原先預計的2030年至2032年。該巡邏艦的雷達截面積(radar cross section)降低,續航能力更強,保海戰力比台灣其他巡邏艦艇更佳。第一艘巡邏艦配備了反艦巡弋飛彈,兩座魚雷發射管和一具拖曳陣列聲納。這些裝備將增強台灣反水面和反潛部隊於潛在的兩岸衝突中的殺傷力。

• Submarines: Taipei is moving forward with a plan to produce diesel-electric submarines, but progress is slow. Taiwan is seeking foreign assistance with the supply of certain components. * In April 2018, Taiwan’s Presidential Office confirmed that the State Department granted a marketing license allowing U.S. companies to conduct commercial briefings for entities involved in Taiwan’s submarine program. Taiwan’s CSBC Corporation, which will build the submarines, estimates the first boat will enter the water in 2024. Of Taiwan’s four submarines, two are operational ZWAARDVIS class submarines (which were built by Dutch company RDM) and two are decommissioned U.S. Navy GUPPY class submarines used only for training.

•潛艇:台北正在計劃建造柴電潛艇,但進展緩慢。台灣正在尋求外國協助,提供某些零件。2018年4月,台灣總統府(Taiwan’s Presidential Office)確認(美國)國務院授予行銷許可證,允許美國公司為與台灣潛艇計劃有關的實體(entities)進行商業簡報。計劃建造潛艇的台灣國際造船公司(CSBC Corporation)估計,第一艘潛艦將於2024年下水。台灣的四艘潛艇中,有兩艘是劍魚級潛艦(ZWAARDVIS class submarines )(由荷蘭RDM公司建造),另外兩艘是退役的美國海軍茄比級潛艦(GUPPY class submarines ),僅用於培訓。

• Advanced jet trainer: Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation began assembly of a new advanced jet trainer for the Taiwan Air Force in June 2018, with the completion of a prototype scheduled for 2019. The new trainers will replace Taiwan’s aging AT-3 and F-5 E/F aircraft.

•先進的噴射教練機:台灣的漢翔航空工業股份有限公司(Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation)於2018年6月開始為台灣空軍組裝新式先進噴射教練機,計劃於2019年完成原型。新式教練機將取代台灣老舊的AT-3和F-5E/F飛機。

Taiwan also seeks to enhance its military capabilities through the procurement of military platforms and weapons systems from overseas. Recent developments in Taiwan’s military procurement from the United States include the following:


• F-16 fighter upgrade: Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation, with U.S. assistance, is upgrading Taiwan’s approximately 140 F-16 A/B fighter aircraft and is scheduled to complete work on the first four aircraft in 2018. The most important part of the upgrade is the installation of active electronically scanned array scalable agile beam radar made by Northrop Grumman. This radar, which is derived from the radar used by the U.S. F-22 and F-35 fighters, will enable Taiwan’s F-16s to detect China’s advanced combat aircraft at a greater range.

•F-16戰機升級:台灣的漢翔航空工業股份有限公司在美國協助下,正在升級台灣大約140架F-16A/B型戰機,計劃於2018年完成前四架飛機的工作。最重要的升級部分是安裝由諾斯洛普·格魯曼公司(Northrop Grumman)製造的主動電子掃描陣列可變敏捷波束雷達(active electronically scanned array scalable agile beam radar)。這是來自美國F-22和F-35戰機使用的雷達,將使台灣的F-16能夠在更大範圍內探測中國的先進戰機。

• Apache attack helicopters: With the commissioning into service of the second of two squadrons in July 2018, all of Taiwan’s 29 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters are now fully operational. Taiwan acquired 30 of these helicopters, which are made by Boeing, but one was destroyed in a crash during training. The AH-64Es can simultaneously track 128 targets and identify the 16 most dangerous, and are each equipped with 16 Hellfire missiles. They would support an effort to counter a PLA invasion force that was approaching or had already landed on Taiwan territory.


• Anti-tank missiles: In 2018, the U.S. and Taiwan governments agreed on the sale of 460 tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireless guided anti-tank missiles to Taiwan. With a range of 2.8 miles, these missiles would help the Taiwan Army defend against PLA hovercraft, amphibious landing vehicles, tanks, and mechanized infantry at a distance, broadening the use of these weapons from their standard deployment against tanks.

•反坦克飛彈:2018年,美國和台灣政府簽署同意向台灣出售460枚管體發射、光學跟踪、無線導引型反坦克飛彈( tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireless guided anti-tank missiles)。這些飛彈的射程為2.8英里¹,可以幫助台灣軍隊遠距離防禦解放軍氣墊船、兩棲登陸車、坦克和機械化步兵,從而擴大反坦克標準部署武器的發揮(範圍)。


U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation


U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation includes arms sales, training, advising, exchanges, and equipment maintenance. This partnership helps Taiwan enhance its ability to deter and, if necessary, defend against an attack from the Chinese military. Among other areas of training, the United States provides training to Taiwan military personnel with a broad range of military specialties, such as fighter pilots, special operations personnel, and rapid runway repair personnel. In addition, Taiwan military personnel undergo education and training at U.S. military institutions. Moreover, between 2008 and 2015, Taiwan was the 10th largest importer of U.S. military equipment. In September, the State Department approved a potential sale to Taiwan of spare parts for various military aircraft and other related program and logistics support elements estimated to cost $330 million. The notification to Congress* of a single foreign military sales order appears to be a policy shift from the practice of “bundling” multiple notifications of potential arms sales to Taiwan to be considered and announced as a single “arms package” decision. The practice of bundling has been criticized as delaying needed sales and complicating Taiwan’s defense budget planning cycles. Addressing individual sales decisions as they arise is more in line with how the United States treats its other foreign security cooperation partners.

美台安全合作包括軍售、培訓、諮詢、交流和設備維護。這種夥伴關係有助於台灣加強威懾戰力,並在必要時防禦來自中國軍方的攻擊。在其他培訓領域,美國向台灣軍事人員提供廣泛的軍事專業培訓,如戰鬥機飛行員、特種作戰人員和機場跑道搶修人員。台灣軍人也在美軍機構接受教育和培訓。此外,2008年至2015年期間,台灣是美國第10大軍事裝備進口國。 9月,國務院批准可能對台灣出售各種軍用飛機及其他相關計畫與後勤支援元件的備用零件,估計價值3.3億美元¹。

向國會發出單一外國軍售訂單的通知顯示政策的轉變,即從「捆綁」 多個潛在對台軍售案的通知,轉變為將其認為是單一「包裹式軍售」的決定並給予宣布。捆綁的做法被批評為推遲所需的銷售,並使台灣的國防預算規劃週期復雜化。個案式處理軍售的決定更符合美國對待其他外國安全合作夥伴的方式。

(參考資料:中央社記者鄭崇生〈美宣布對台軍售3.3億美元 著重台灣空防升級〉2018/09/25)
(參考資料:中央社記者游凱翔〈學者:美對台軍售改個案審查 軍事交流朝正規化〉2018/09/25 )

The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 includes several provisions related to U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation, including directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of Taiwan’s military forces and providing related recommendations. The act also includes a sense of Congress on various aspects of security cooperation, such as arms sales, training and exercises, high-level exchanges, and a potential visit of a U.S. hospital ship to Taiwan. Taiwan’s Premier William Lai said he would welcome a potential joint exercise between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries


(參考資料:中央社記者江今葉〈美參院通過國防授權法 支持強化台灣軍力〉2018/08/02)
(參考資料:中央社記者顧荃〈台灣若加入美國軍演 賴揆:有利周邊聯合防衛〉2018/08/03)
(參考資料:中央社記者鄭崇生〈川普簽了 美國防授權法生效〉2018/08/14)
(參考資料:萊茵〈以後美軍「罩」台灣?美 2019 財年《國防授權法》與台相關條文全文中譯,兼論其「意義」〉,來源:「換日線 Crossing」網站。)

Military-to-military contacts between the United States and Taiwan are robust, although in general, State Department practice has limited visitors to Taiwan to midor lower-level U.S. personnel, and U.S. military observer delegations (such as those attending the Han Kuang exercise) are led by a retired general or flag officer. The practice of limiting the highest rank of U.S. military personnel who can visit Taiwan to colonels and U.S. Navy captains (O6 level) prevents the most senior U.S. officers from gaining firsthand knowledge of the Taiwan military and the operational environment in a potential cross-Strait conflict. Furthermore, the U.S. government has not invited Taiwan to the major U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific exercise, Red Flag air-to-air combat training exercise, or the cybersecurity exercise Cyber Storm.

美國和台灣之間的軍事聯繫是強而有力的,儘管通常國務院的做法將前往台灣的參訪者限制在中或低級別美方職員,以及由一位退役的將領或海軍將級軍官所率領的美國軍事觀察代表團(例如參觀漢光演習的人員)。將能夠訪問台灣的美國軍人最高級別限制在陸軍上校和美國海軍上尉(O6級別)的做法,阻止了美國最高級軍官於潛在的兩岸衝突中獲得台灣軍方和作戰環境的第一手資料。此外,美國政府還沒有邀請台灣參加由美國主導的環太平洋軍事演習、紅旗空戰訓練演習或網絡安全演習「網路風暴(Cyber Storm)」。

Implications for the United States


In the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Congress declared that “peace and stability in the [Western Pacific] area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States.” The Taiwan Relations Act also makes clear that “the United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” Further, the Act states that it is U.S. policy “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”

在1979年的〈台灣關係法〉中,國會宣布「[西太平洋]地區的和平與安定符合美國的政治、安全和經濟利益。」〈台灣關係法〉也明確表示「美國」 「和『中華人民共和國』建立外交關係之舉,是基於臺灣的前途將以和平方式決定這一期望。」此外,該法案規定,美國的政策是「任何企圖以非和平方式來決定臺灣的前途之舉──包括使用經濟抵制及禁運手段在內,將被視為對西太平洋地區和平及安定的威脅,而為美國所嚴重關切。」


Since that time, the United States has encouraged the development of a multi-party democracy in Taiwan and continued a policy of providing defensive arms and services to Taiwan. The credibility of U.S. foreign policy and security commitments is tied in part to U.S. support for Taiwan, especially as viewed by U.S. allies and partners throughout the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, Taiwan’s continued existence as a friendly, democratic partner is of critical geostrategic importance to the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and other countries in the region. James R. Holmes, J.C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that if China were to control Taiwan it

從那時起,美國一直鼓勵台灣發展多黨民主政治,並繼續奉行向台灣提供防禦性武器與服務的政策。美國外交政策和安全承諾的可靠程度,與美國對台灣的支持有關,尤其是美國在整個印度─太平洋地區的盟友與合作夥伴都看在眼裡。此外,台灣繼續作為一個友好、民主的伙伴,對美國、日本、菲律賓和該地區其他國家具有重要的地緣戰略意義。美國海軍戰爭學院J.C.威利海洋戰略教授席位詹姆斯·R·霍姆斯(James R. Holmes)寫道,如果中國控制台灣,

would extend the Chinese reach eastward into the Western Pacific; turn the southern flanks of Japan and South Korea, giving Beijing newfound geostrategic leverage; enable [PLA Navy] warships to command the northern rim of the South China Sea and also project power to the Luzon Strait and elsewhere in the northern reaches of that expanse.


PLA writings attest to the importance of Taiwan to China’s broader geostrategic ambitions. The PLA’s calculations on the importance of Taiwan to China’s military posture was revealed in the seminal 2001 edition of its renowned publication, The Science of Military Strategy, which states,

解放軍的許多著作證實了台灣對中國更廣大地緣戰略之野心的重要性。台灣對中國軍事態勢之重要性的計算,顯示在其著名出版物2001年版的《軍事戰略學(The Science of Military Strategy)》中,

If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only our natural maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to outside forces, but also a large area of water territory would fall into the hands of others. […] What’s more, our line of foreign trade and transportation which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance and threats of separatists and enemy forces and China will forever be locked to the west side of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.


(譯註:譯文取自網路。《The Science of Military Strategy》編著者為PENG GUANGQIAN AND YAO YOUZHI ,對應的中文(可能)是彭光謙,姚有志。 )

The PLA, as well as China’s highest-ranking civilian leaders, almost certainly continue to maintain this view.


In sum, the threat China’s military modernization poses to Taiwan’s continued existence as a vibrant democracy and important U.S. security and economic partner presents fundamental challenges not only to the success of democracy in the Indo-Pacific, but to the security of U.S. treaty allies throughout the region. The steady improvements in China’s military capabilities enhance Beijing’s ability to use the threat of military force to coerce Taipei into making political concessions. The shift in the military balance underscores the importance of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges, and other areas of security cooperation.


In the economic realm, Taiwan has experienced increased economic growth and gradual improvements in employment and wages while tackling difficult issues such as labor standards and pension reforms. However, Taiwan’s economy remains overly reliant on China, making it susceptible to economic intimidation and pressure campaigns carried out by the Chinese government. Taiwan businesses operating in China also continue to be faced with the ever-present threat of retaliation by Beijing if they do not explicitly endorse the “1992 Consensus.”


To address these vulnerabilities, Taipei has worked to diversify its trade and investment ties away from Beijing through the New Southbound Policy and other domestic economic initiatives. Moreover, the United States and Taiwan continue to cooperate on mutually beneficial economic projects—particularly in advanced technology industries like AI—through corporate partnerships and joint research centers. Taiwan is the United States’ eleventh-largest trading partner, while the United States is Taiwan’s second-largest trade partner, signaling the enduring importance of U.S.-Taiwan economic ties. Taiwan’s government continues to recognize the importance of furthering Taiwan’s economic relationship with the United States, as increased trade and investment offer benefits both for Taiwan’s development and U.S. economic interests.


Working with Taiwan to solve international problems and supporting Taiwan’s participation in the international community benefits the United States in many ways. Taiwan’s robust civil society and technology sector and its vast expertise and experience in areas such as disaster response and relief make it a strong partner for the United States. Taiwan also has much to contribute in other areas, such as aviation safety, combating the spread of infectious diseases, environmental protection, and law enforcement and fighting transnational crime. Furthermore, Taiwan’s inability to access information from international organizations such as the World Health Organization, INTERPOL, and the International Civil Aviation Organization creates global health, security, and aviation safety risks.


Taiwan has long contended with Beijing’s efforts to influence its policies, and is the target of an intensifying political warfare campaign in an attempt by Beijing to undermine its democracy. The United States and the rest of the world have much to learn from Taiwan about CCP influence and interference in democracies. Finally, Taiwan, with its robust democracy and free-market economy, is a model for other countries and a natural partner for the United States in its free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. A vibrant Taiwan and a strong, multi-dimensional U.S.-Taiwan partnership are of intrinsic value to the United States.